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Natural Affection, the Patriarchal Family and the “Strict Settlement” Debate: A Response from 
the History of Emotions 
Katie Barclay 




Thirty years ago, partly inspired by the 1977 publication of Lawrence Stone’s The Family, Sex 
and Marriage in Britain, 1500--1800, a number of historians engaged in a debate on the reasons 
and implications for the rise of the “strict settlement” in England from around 1650. In a legal 
context where long-term entails (restrictions on the use and inheritance of land) were prohibited, 
the strict settlement was a legal device that allowed landowners to limit their heirs’ control of the 
family estate. Like an entail, it established the appropriate heir and removed many of her or, 
typically his, rights to the use and disposal of property, protecting the long-term family interest 
over that of the individual. It also, as a general rule, set out what a family’s younger children 
could expect as an inheritance. Stone used the strict settlement to support his claim that across 
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the English family saw a reduction in patriarchal power 
due to the rise of the “affective family.”1 
According to Stone, following scholars like Philippe Ariès, the early modern family was 
“low affect,” due to a combination of difficult living conditions and low life expectancy that 
stopped people from emotionally investing in their families.2 Over the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries, demographic and cultural changes provided space, so the argument goes, 
for people to love, leading to more affective family life. For Stone, affection and patriarchy were 
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incompatible, and so, after a short-lived resurgence of formal patriarchy, increased affection 
brought greater equality within the family.3 For Stone, the strict settlement, arising during the 
seventeenth century, evidenced this shift because while it formalized patriarchal descent of 
property, it showed parental love in the provisions it made for younger children. 
The book was immediately controversial. For legal historians interested in the strict 
settlement, there were two main topics of debate: a) whether the settlement was patriarchal, and 
b) whether it proved Stone’s thesis. Eileen Spring brought a feminist perspective, arguing that 
providing for younger children was not a reduction in patriarchy as it prioritized sons over 
daughters as the main heir and the device tended to exclude daughters from inheriting the main 
estate.4 She thought that Stone, and his predecessor John Habbakuk, ignored that the settlement 
was used as mechanism to replace wives’ dower rights to a third of their husbands’ estates with 
jointure, usually a cash annuity of, she argued, less value.5 For Spring, the strict settlement may 
show that fathers loved their younger children, but it definitely diminished the rights of women 
and was no reduction in patriarchy.  
The other main intervention in this conversation was Lloyd Bonfield, who conducted an 
empirical study of a large set of strict settlements and gave qualified support to Stone’s thesis.6 
He argued that over time, and with due caution given to the novelty of the strict settlement to the 
period, fathers’ control over their children’s inheritance declined, which was a reduction in 
patriarchal power likely motivated by a rise in affection enabled by a decline in family size. 
Vivienne Larminie contributed an in-depth study of a small number of families’ uses of the strict 
settlement to suggest that it was one among many strategies to balance a broader patriarchal ideal 
with the affections of the family towards its younger members.7 Historians of the strict 
settlement went on to explore its role in estate consolidation among aristocratic families.8 They 
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did not, however, come back to the question of what these findings meant for the early modern 
family and their emotional attachments. This was partly due to a concurrent discussion of 
Stone’s work among social historians. Almost from the outset, a number of early modernists 
rejected the assertion that their period was low affect, an idea borne out in the last thirty years of 
research.9 Moreover, Spring was not alone in querying whether patriarchy precluded affection, 
with feminist scholars demonstrating their compatibility into the twentieth century and beyond.10 
This group, however, was less interested in the strict settlement; social historians’ main 
interaction with that entity has been in relation to property ownership and transmission, rather 
than intimacy within family life.11  
This article looks at the strict settlement anew, locating it against the backdrop of the 
latest research on the history of the family and the rise of the history of emotions as a 
methodology. It is no longer appropriate to engage in the same debate as that undertaken by 
Stone, Spring, and Bonfield. The co-existence of patriarchy and affection across the eighteenth 
century is no longer in dispute and there is no doubt that the early modern period was not low 
affect.12 Whether the “affective family,” as a specific emotional-family form that is unique to the 
eighteenth century, can be identified is a more open question, as is the role of the strict 
settlement in enabling its existence. While earlier studies of the strict settlement focused on the 
document, trying to use what people did to understand why, this article takes a cultural studies 
approach, drawing on popular legal commentary, popular culture, and a number of Restoration 
plays to access why people thought it was a useful legal device. In doing so, it turns focus from 
the relationship between fathers and their younger children—so key to Stone, Spring, and 
Bonfield’s debate—to that between the father and his heir, and between the heir and his siblings. 
This article begins by providing some legal and cultural context for the strict settlement, before 
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discussing how it was viewed by contemporaries. It argues that, at least for a number of late 
seventeenth and early eighteenth-century commentators, the purpose of the strict settlement was 
to enable affection between family members, while ensuring the continuance of patriarchal 
family life. Throughout, it contrasts the English with the Scottish experience and argues that 
Scotland’s adoption of entail was the more “logical” solution to the social problem England tried 
to solve with the strict settlement. It provides a case study of a legal response to an emotional 
problem and an example of emotion driving processes of social change.13 It also feeds into a 
wider theme across the essays in this special issue on the ways that textual forms, in this case the 
settlement, were understood to produce or create the conditions for particular emotions in the 
eighteenth-century public.14 
 
TRANSMITTING PROPERTY AND NATURAL AFFECTION: A CONTEXT 
The transferral of property after death was subject to significant statute law, as well as the will of 
the deceased and any entails or restrictions attached to pieces of land. In Scotland and England, 
there was a difference between “real” or “heritable” property (land, houses, some types of rental 
and other fixtures related to land) and moveable property (everything else), which affected how 
property was transferred across generations and the court that had jurisdiction to manage 
disputes.15 Strict settlement and entails were legal devices that related mainly to heritable 
property, so moveable property will not be discussed here. In Scotland and England, if a parent 
died intestate, heritable property was vested in the eldest male child or, failing a male heir, in all 
daughters equally (failing which, complex lists of succession came into play). A widow had a 
life interest in a third of her husband’s heritable property (dower) and a widower a life interest in 
all of his wife’s heritable property, unless waived by contract or entail. The former was common 
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from the seventeenth century, where wives took jointures, instead of dower, and excluded their 
property from coverture in England or the jus mariti in Scotland. A life interest gave the use and 
profits of estates during life, but did not allow the interest holder to sell or bequeath property.16 
In Scotland, children could not be disinherited from their rights to real property except in 
exceptional circumstances such as treason or patricide. They could waive their rights by contract, 
which usually happened during marriage negotiations and was typically balanced by a settlement 
of similar value, such as cash or a different estate.17 In England, the owner of real property was 
free to dispose of it as he or she wished and could disinherit children without cause. A spouse 
could not remove his or her partner’s life interest in the property (unless previously waived by 
contract or entail), but could bequeath it to someone else after the partner died.18  
This situation was complicated by the growing popularity of entails or entail-like devices 
from the seventeenth century. An entail was a set of conditions attached to heritable property that 
restricted its usage. Typically, entails ratified primogeniture by giving the estate to the nearest 
male heir, often to the exclusion of daughters. They placed the land in trust for posterity, so that 
an heir merely held a life interest, restricting him from selling or burdening it with debt. Entails 
sometimes excluded dower from attaching to the property to the detriment of wives; they may 
require the heir of the estate to take a particular family name; they might exclude the subsuming 
of the estate into a larger one. Entails had existed since the medieval period, but their legality in 
general, and what they could restrict, was a matter of debate.19  
In Scotland in 1685, the Entail Act ratified the legitimacy of entails as long as they were 
registered. Scotland’s entail law was virtually unrestricted, allowing property owners to convey 
their estates as they saw fit and for an indefinite period.20 It was complemented, like in England, 
by marriage settlements that defined what property the wife brought to the marriage, her jointure 
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(or occasionally dower entitlement), and the younger children’s inheritance if not determined by 
entail.21 England legislated against entails on the grounds that it unfairly encumbered the rights 
of the heir and unwisely restricted the use of the land. The seventeenth-century legal invention of 
the strict settlement allowed landowners to place restrictions on property, but only for a term of 
twenty-one years after the death of the last surviving party to the settlement. The result was that a 
large number of estates in England operated under a form of entail that was renegotiated in each 
generation, usually during marriage contract discussions.22  
The rise of entails in Scotland and the strict settlement in England was accompanied by a 
growing debate among members of the legislature, judiciary, lawyers, and the general public 
about how statute and common law should be made and interpreted by individuals and the legal 
system. As the law was a constantly changing organism responding to new ideas and social 
values, during the seventeenth and early eighteenth century, its shape in both Scotland and 
England was informed by, among other things, the rise in natural law theory.23 An increasingly 
popular topic among philosophers and legal theorists during the seventeenth century, natural law 
theory located the origin of the law in nature, and, not dissimilarly to Common Law in England, 
argued that it should not overstep the boundaries of “natural” relationships, reason, and common 
sense. The interest in and influence of natural law on English and Scottish law during the period 
has been well documented.24 
For natural law theorists, the determining principles for inheritance should be those of 
“natural affection,” an instinctual form of love that parents had for their children, designed to 
ensure the successful reproduction of the species. For many thinkers, this affection could extend 
from children to parents and between siblings, and possibly outward to other family members, 
depending on the importance they placed on “the family” as a determinant in the survival of 
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humanity. The principles of succession in inheritance law, for natural law theorists, should 
follow the natural affections of the individual, so children should inherit before siblings, and 
siblings before wider kin. While some tried to justify primogeniture as a natural institution, most 
believed that parents instinctively loved all their children, and so wished to provide for all. 
However, as they were also pragmatic and invested in patriarchal structures, many natural law 
theorists recognized the importance of primogeniture to the maintenance of family estates and to 
the stability of a hierarchical social system.25 As a result, the inheritance law in operation in 
Scotland and England did not cause too many problems.  
Despite this, it is worth acknowledging the growing importance of natural affection in 
legal justifications of inheritance law and in contemporary debates around inheritance practices. 
This was particularly true in Scotland, where James Dalrymple, Lord Stair, located the duties of 
children and parents in natural law and used it to justify inheritance practice, in his influential 
summary of the Scots law in 1681.26 As a result, the language of natural affection became 
increasingly significant during inheritance disputes and in framing how wider society understood 
the relationship between different members of the family.27 
 
REPRESENTING THE STRICT SETTLEMENT 
Inheritance practices were topics of public debate and entertainment, not least during the rather 
atypical 1688 “warming-pan” incident that questioned the legitimacy of James Francis Edward 
Stuart, Prince of Wales.28 Across the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, there was a long-
running public debate over the utility of primogeniture, and particularly its disadvantages for 
younger sons, who were left penniless and at the mercy of older brothers.29 This debate 
occasionally came to the fore during particular scandals, such as when Sir George Sondes’s 
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youngest son murdered his elder brother.30 The conversation was rejuvenated in the mid-
seventeenth century by Levellers and others attempting to renegotiate the balance of power 
between the aristocracy and the commonwealth. They believed that the storing up of wealth by a 
few through primogeniture was inconsistent with rebalancing political power across social 
groups.31  
Joan Thirsk has argued that this public debate fell out of fashion at the end of the 
seventeenth century with the rising popularity of the strict settlement that included a provision 
for younger sons.32 Yet this was not entirely true; rather the debate evolved to reflect 
contemporary concerns.33 The Exclusion Crisis, followed by the deposing of James II in 1688, 
was a stark challenge to the line of succession within common law, although reflecting the wider 
English practice of freedom of the testator (in this case, in Whig thought, the commonwealth). It 
led to a flurry of pamphlets debating the basis of primogeniture and carried this conversation into 
the eighteenth century as the Stuarts’ claim to the throne rumbled on.34 More broadly, the 
question of inheritance was taken up by constitutional writers, including Robert Filmer and John 
Locke, as they explored the nature and basis of patriarchal governance. Yet as Rachel Weil 
shows, both Tory and Whig writers were relatively ambivalent over the divine origin of 
primogeniture, preferring to situate their claims in the British laws of succession.35  
Given this ambivalence, the fact that so many elite testators reinforced primogeniture 
through entails and testaments requires some explanation. One of the main justifications was that 
it ensured social order. John Page, a lawyer and Master in the Chancery Court, argued:  
What I pray you can be more reasonable and necessary, then that there should be a chief son or 
heir, amongst our children: for there must necessarily be an order and subordination in all things 
otherwise there will be a confusion in all things, and what follows confusion, … but an 
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everlasting horrour.36Primogeniture was necessary for the “peace and concord” among brothers, 
as otherwise they would “malign” and “envy” each other. Similarly, removing that decision from 
fathers through the legal device of the entail or strict settlement allowed for a more harmonious 
family relationship.  
This point was made by a number of playwrights in the late seventeenth and early 
eighteenth century, where inheritance disputes were key plot devices.37 Nahum Tate’s reworking 
of William Shakespeare’s King Lear emphasized the instability that will-making caused to the 
family, encouraging avarice and greed and ultimately tragedy as family members turned on each 
other.38 Unlike Shakespeare, the Tory Tate provided a “happy ending,” restoring the deposed 
heirs of Cordelia and Edgar to their estates (they also marry each other). Laura Rosenthal 
suggests this happy ending is necessary in Restoration Britain, where the instability of the 
monarchy made the inevitable return to political stability of Shakespeare’s King Lear less 
certain.39 But it also played into a more everyday problem where the political machinations of 
siblings in competition for inheritance were distasteful to an audience who demanded affection 
within the family and increasingly saw affection as a necessary limit to tyranny. As Weil notes, 
Whigs like Locke distinguished between “legal fathers” such as the monarch, and biological 
fathers. The latter had a natural right to absolute power over their children because their natural 
affection would temper tyranny. The monarch did not have that relationship with the 
commonwealth and therefore should not hold absolute power.40 
The importance of natural affection was raised within the Tory Aphra Behn’s comedy 
The City Heiress (1682) and, more explicitly, by the Whig William Congreve in his play Love 
for Love (1695). Both stories focus on a difficult relationship between an heir and his future 
benefactor, revolving around the young libertine heir’s need for money, with a side plot of love 
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intrigue with women of large fortunes. The plot exists in a number of earlier and later plays.41 In 
Behn’s City Heiress, the young Tory Wilding attempts to trick his elderly Whig uncle Sir 
Timothy Treat-all into giving him enough money to enable his extravagant lifestyle.42 His uncle, 
as the name Treat-all suggests, is a generous host to his Whig compatriots, but will not support 
his future heir. A libertine, Wilding is courting both a rich gentry widow and a wealthy city 
heiress, and has a courtesan, Diana, but has no intention of marrying any of them. Sir Timothy 
and Wilding argue at the beginning of the play, with Treat-all telling Wilding to live by his wits 
and threatening to marry and disinherit him with a direct heir. Wilding threatens to cuckold him 
and so divert the inheritance back to him, if indirectly. Wilding passes off Diana as the wealthy 
city heiress, suspecting that his uncle would try to marry her, and then robs his uncle of his deeds 
and some seditious documents. Sir Timothy marries Diana, and so fulfils Wilding’s threat to 
cuckold him—Diana even hinting that any heir she produces might in fact be Wilding’s. In a side 
plot, another character coerces the gentry widow into marriage. The play concludes with Wilding 
unmasking Diana to his uncle and blackmailing him into reinstating him as the heir. Hinting at 
redemption from his libertine ways, Wilding marries the city heiress Charlot, the only woman 
who has remained loyal to him, offering to live off her fortune until his uncle’s death.    
Ten years later, Congreve’s Love for Love saw the first-born son and libertine wastrel 
Valentine attempting to convince his father, Sir Sampson Legend, to support the lavish lifestyle 
that he requires to court Angelica, a woman with an independent fortune and no title.43 His father 
agrees to pay his debts (and no more), but only if he agrees to sign over his inheritance to his 
younger brother. Valentine initially concurs but, to avoid signing the bond, pretends to be mad. 
Angelica resolves the situation by convincing Sir Sampson to propose marriage to her (with the 
promise of creating a new heir and settling the estates on him) and then gets hold of the bonds. 
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When Valentine hears of this proposed marriage, he agrees to sign the bond in despair, but 
Angelica turns the tables by destroying the bond and declaring her love for Valentine.  
Like in Tate’s King Lear, social order is disrupted in both stories by the threat to 
disinherit the rightful heir, and is restored when the heir is once more in place to inherit. This 
restoration of order is reinforced by the marriage of both libertines, whereby their sexual 
misbehavior and spending is brought under control. This can be read as a political metaphor due 
to the association between libertine behavior and political freedom. The young heirs demonstrate 
their political independence through their lascivious lifestyles (and explicitly through Wilding’s 
rejection of his uncle’s politics) but, by bringing the testator back into an orderly relationship 
with the heir, such overt political freedom is no longer necessary and benign patriarchy can be 
restored. In both The City Heiress and Love for Love, this is done through the creation of strict 
settlements that restrain the power of the patriarch to disinherit his heir.  
This metaphor can be extended to the relationship between the gentry and the city, 
through the marriage of the heiresses into the social elite. In The City Heiress, Charlot’s 
independent fortune is explicitly understood to be commercial money, while Angelica’s family is 
not titled. Angelica’s “illiterate” and superstitious uncle Foresight is never given a title, and his 
wife is referred to as Mrs. Foresight throughout. While the pursuit of the middle-class heiress 
was a long-lived and popular trope that reflected the shifting balance of financial wealth in early 
modern Britain (if not actual marriage practice), that both these heiresses marry members of the 
gentry restores class relationships.44 These plays were not stories that saw the movement of the 
merchant classes into the elites through upwardly mobile marriages. Charlot’s family is 
conspicuously absent, while Angelica’s parents are in the country. Angelica’s city family are 
already good friends with Sir Sampson, and the restoration of the inheritance to Valentine 
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removes the possibility of a marriage between Foresight’s own daughter and Sir Sampson’s 
second son, Ben. Rather, it is merchant wealth that is absorbed into the gentry through marriage, 
reinforcing the political status quo. 
Through providing heirs with independent fortunes, these tales neatly resolve the 
financial predicament that many sons, both elder and younger, found themselves in as they 
waited for their inheritance. More widely, however, people increasingly felt that this was a 
predicament that should be solved by fathers and other testators’ natural affection for their heirs. 
The seventeenth-century pamphleteer “B.J.,” probably Chancery lawyer John Brydall, defended 
heirs from the “impious practice of some fathers disinheriting their first-begotten sons.” He 
argued that to leave an heir without “present sustenance” was as “Prodigious and Unnatural” as 
disinheriting him completely.45 The importance of natural affection between testator and heir 
was made explicit in Love for Love, where Angelica lectures Sir Sampson after her trick is 
revealed: “Learn to be a good Father, or you’ll never get a second Wife. I always lov’d your son 
and hated your unforgiving nature ... . You have not more Faults than he has Virtues.”46 For 
Behn and Congreve, the lack of maintenance provided to the heirs and the unaffectionate desire 
to disinherit them was set up as equally problematic, if not more so, than the spendthrift and 
sexually immoral behavior of the heirs. This belief was reinforced by popular “prodigal son” 
tales that emphasized the importance of paternal or fraternal forgiveness of the spendthrift or 
greedy child.47  
While not described as unfatherly, Sir Timothy is called “cruel” and a “hard old man” 
“mollified” into “good nature” through Wilding’s trick. His “unnatural” behavior is reinforced 
by his desire to remarry and have an heir of his own, a decision rendered unacceptable due to his 
age. The courtesan, Diana, who represents the shared estate of uncle and nephew, contrasts the 
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“soft dear Arms of Wilding round my neck, From those cold feeble ones of this old Dotard; 
When I shall meet, instead of Tom’s warm kisses, A hollow pair of thin blue wither’d Lips, 
Trembling with Palsie, stinking with Disease.”48 Playing on the distaste for May-December 
marriages during the period, Treat-all’s decision to marry a much younger woman in his dotage 
stands for his “unnatural” treatment of his nephew.49 Treat-all’s desire to retain his estates and 
his youth, at the expense of his nephew, is solved through the strict settlement suggested by 
Wilding at the end of the play, where Treat-all retains the estate during life and Wilding has “a 
Fortune here [in Charlot] that will maintain me, Without so much as wishing for your death.” 
Treat-all is sent home with Diana as “a Comfort to your Age,” and told not to “trouble your 
decrepid Age with business of State.”50 Within these plays, as suggested by Whig contract 
theorists, natural affection is a necessary prerequisite for the effective functioning of patriarchal 
authority. Conversely, and fitting in the case of Behn—who has been viewed as cynic in the 
tradition of Bernard Mandeville, who locates even parental love as a fragile form of self-love —
the strict settlement was the device that ensured natural affection.51 
 
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS 
The strict settlement provided a contract that allowed fathers and their children, but particularly 
their eldest sons, to manifest the natural affection that was necessary for the operation of non-
tyrannical patriarchy. In doing so, it removed the pernicious effects of greed on family life, 
where parent was pitted against child and sibling against sibling, and defended against the 
growing commercialization of the era that threatened what many viewed as the legitimate 
authority of the aristocracy in society necessary to ensure social order.52 Perhaps ironically, it did 
so through the use of contract—a device that acknowledged the socially constructed (rather than 
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natural) character of family life. In this, it was not dissimilar to marriage, a natural and sacred 
institution whose terms were determined by God—but a relationship where the language of 
contract that was used to explain it simultaneously threatened its stability by suggesting its terms 
were available for negotiation.53 
The use of contract reinforced the authority of the patriarch, but located his authority in 
the consent of those under contract. While there were certain benefits of this for the relationship 
between king and subject, contract was fundamentally more challenging for relationships within 
the family, which were viewed as natural, or God-ordained, and which were justified by the 
existence of natural affection that was expected to temper tyranny. As a result, the Scottish 
solution of the entail was a better solution to the social problem of primogeniture. By freezing 
the contract, entail removed the negotiation between parent and child, “naturalizing” family 
relationships. Scotland allowed entail as they had not historically legislated against them, but 
also because of the importance of natural affection to the construction of Scots law in the 1680s, 
which allowed the entail to appear as an effective solution to discord within the family created by 
disagreements over money. The strict settlement provided a legal solution to an emotional 
problem. The case study of the strict settlement acts to demonstrate that changing emotional 
ideals and emotions themselves were drivers of significant social and legal change. 
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